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STATE-COURT PROTECTION OF
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: THE
HISTORIANS' NEGLECT
David M. Gold*

In the March 1984 issue of the ABA Journal, Professor Ronald
K.L. Collins of the Willamette University College of Law, writing
of the continuing importance of state constitutional safeguards of
individual rights, concluded that "lawyers of the 1980s ought to be
prepared to bring to state courts working with state law that same
measure of talent and imagination that is too often reserved for federal cases." This admonition should also be addressed to students of
constitutional history, for they too have neglected state constitutional law. Of course, it is not surprising, after the great expansion
of federal constitutional rights, that some civil libertarians treat individual rights solely as a branch of federal constitutional law.
Thus, Joel M. Gora of the American Civil Liberties Union, in his
book Due Process of Law, says that "while the specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights were intended to be direct limitations on the federal government, there were no comparable constitutional restrictions upon the conduct of state and local governments until shortly
after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment."I Unfortunately,
many professional historians and other scholars seem to hold the
same view.
This misapprehension is both reflected and reinforced by the
disregard in virtually every constitutional history textbook and anthology of developments in the states during the period between ratification of the Constitution and the twentieth-century
"incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment. C. Herman Pritchett's The American Constitution exemplifies the problem. Pritchett, a respected constitutional scholar,
writes: "Three-quarters of a century elapsed after the Bill of Rights
was added to the Constitution before any more amendments dealing
with civil liberties were adopted. No detailed account of the application of constitutional guarantees during that period can or need
•
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be attempted." 2 Pritchett's entire discussion of that period consists
of one sentence on Calder v. Bull, a 1798 case dealing with ex post
facto laws, and one on the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which
he brushes aside because the constitutional questions they raised
"never got to the Supreme Court."
The same omission occurs in textbooks by Carl B. Swisher,
Forrest McDonald, Page Smith, and Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, as
well as documentary histories assembled by Donald Dewey, Stanley
Kutler, and James Smith and Paul Murphy. One searches these
works in vain for any suggestion that state courts of the nineteenth
century took personal rights seriously.
Many specialized studies are similarly flawed. Nelson B. Lasson's The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution has four chapters, three on the prehistory
and ratification of the fourth amendment and one on its treatment
in the United States Supreme Court, which for practical purposes
begins with 1886. Francis H. Heller's The Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States: A Study in Constitutional Development jumps from the colonial experience to the 1870's and contains
not a single citation to a state court decision. The Right to Counsel
in American Courts, by William M. Beany, brushes lightly over the
years from 1789 to 1938, again with no citations to state cases.
Robert L. Cord's recent history of church-state relations, Separation of Church and State: Historical Fact and Current Fiction, leaps
from Jefferson and Madison to the Supreme Court's decision in Everson v. Board of Education in 1947.
The treatment of Bible reading in the public schools in the first
four editions of Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison's standard textbook, The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development, strikingly illustrates the tendency of scholars to overlook
state constitutional history. When The American Constitution first
appeared in 1948, it said nothing at all on the subject of Bible reading. The next two editions (1955 and 1963) noted in passing the
number of states that required or permitted the reading of Scripture
in the classroom. Then, in 1963, the Supreme Court decided School
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, striking down a Pennsylvania law that mandated the daily reading of at least ten verses of
the Bible in all public schools. The fourth edition of The American
Constitution (1970) devoted two paragraphs to Schempp and more
than eight pages altogether to the Warren Court's decisions regarding the establishment of religion.
2.
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One might surmise from the successive editions of Kelly and
Harbison's text that the Supreme Court entered upon a virgin field
and created constitutional doctrine where none existed before. But
in fact the nineteenth century witnessed intense constitutional debates over the use of the Bible in the classroom, and the arguments
then brought to bear in the state courts retain their relevance today.
The leading nineteenth-century case was Donahoe v. Richards, 3
decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine at the height of the
nativist movement in 1854. An Irish Catholic girl had been expelled from a public school for refusing to participate in the required reading of the Protestant Bible. The state constitution had
its versions of the free exercise clause ("no one shall be hurt, molested or restrained in his person, liberty or estate, for worshiping
God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his
conscience") and the establishment clause ("no subordination nor
preference of any sect or denomination . . . shall ever be established by law"). The pupil's attorney argued that the mandatory
reading of the King James Bible was an unconstitutional religious
test for continuance in school; that it was governmental interference
with religious belief; that it discriminated against the minority; and,
despite the school board's claim that this Bible was used only for
instruction in reading, that it was designed to indoctrinate religious
dissidents in the majority faith.
The Maine court decided in favor of the school board. It held
that the free exercise clause was meant only to prevent the imposition of legal penalties or the deprivation of political rights because
of religious belief. It agreed that the teaching of dogma would have
been unconstitutional, but denied that the use of the King James
Bible for instruction in reading violated the state's establishment
clause.
Donahoe v. Richards was a highly influential case; it figured
prominently in the Cincinnati "Bible War" of 1869-1870 and was
frequently cited by other courts. Yet before the century closed, the
judicial tide had begun to turn against Scripture reading in the public schools. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in 1890 moved toward the "wall of separation" theory adopted by the United States
Supreme Court more than half a century later. In State ex rei.
Weiss v. District Board of School District No. 8,4 the Wisconsin court
held that the practice of reading teacher-selected portions of the
King James Bible in the classroom contravened the section of the
state constitution that forbade sectarian religious instruction in the
3.
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public schools. The court found it "too clear for argument" that
Bible reading, even without comment by the teacher, constituted
religious instruction. The fact that Catholic and Jewish children
were free to leave the room during the reading did not make the
practice constitutional; the exclusion of a small minority from a
school exercise, especially when the cause was "apparent hostility to
the Bible which a majority of the pupils have been taught to revere," subjected the minority to possible reproach and insult, and
tended to destroy equality. One concurring judge went even further, declaring that under the Wisconsin Constitution the state, "as
a civil government, and all its civil institutions, are divorced from
all possible connection or alliance with any and all religions, religious worship, religious establishments, or modes of worship, and
with everything of a religious character or appertaining to
religion. "5
As the Maine and Wisconsin cases show, Bible reading in the
public schools was an important constitutional issue long before the
Supreme Court passed upon it. So too was freedom of expression in
wartime, although state decisions on this subject also are missing
from constitutional history texts. Once again, events in Maine are
illuminating. Soon after the Civil War, the owner of a pro-Southern
newspaper in Bangor sued members of a patriotic mob that had
destroyed his press in 1861. The jury, following the judge's instructions, found that the paper had been a public nuisance which the
defendants had been justified in abating. In another Maine case a
few years later, a man named Prentiss brought an action against
several people who had handled him roughly when he praised John
Wilkes Booth for assassinating Lincoln. The jury returned a small
damage award.
Neither of these cases was "constitutional" in the narrow
sense, since the plaintiffs had based their suits on trespass rather
than on the deprivation of constitutional rights. However, the contests revolved around the issues of free speech and free press. In the
newspaper case, the judge told the jury:
"Freedom of thought, freedom of speech and freedom of the press, have long been
considered a part of republican institutions and necessary ingredients of them; but
this freedom has never been an unlimited, unrestricted right to speak, write and
publish without accountability. The press enjoys no such privilege now or at any
other period in the history of this country. Its constitutional guarantee is not to
trample upon the rights of the individual; neither is it to destroy the very government which upholds, and confers upon it its privileges. " 6

5.
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In the Prentiss case, however, the judge declared: "Under the Constitution, every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments upon any subject. . . . He may use the most shocking,
indecent and revolting language, towards his own father, towards
the Government, anywhere, at any time . . . . "7 As these cases
illustrate, some state courts were wrestling with the problem of dissent in wartime decades before the Supreme Court confronted the
issue.
At least one torrid nineteenth-century debate over constitutional rights never reached the Supreme Court at all. Most people,
including the majority of lawyers, are surprised to learn that criminal defendants in America could not take the stand in their own
defense until 1864, and then in only one state. The grant of testimonial competency to the defendant spread during the last third of the
nineteenth century, but the reform was not completed until 1962.
Supporters of the change argued that the defendant knew best
whether or not he had committed the crime and therefore ought to
be permitted to speak. Opponents maintained that since no jury
would believe in the innocence of a man who refused to testify in his
own behalf, the defendant would in effect be compelled to testify,
making his privilege against self-incrimination worthless. The debate raged for decades in legal periodicals, legislative halls, and
state courts, yet this constitutional controversy of the first magnitude has gone virtually unnoticed by the textbook writers and
anthologizers.
Of course, there are exceptions to the record of scholarly neglect of state constitutional history. Some incisive studies, such as
EdwardS. Corwin's articles on vested rights and due process before
the Civil War and Harry N. Scheiber's analysis of eminent domain
law before 1877, have examined property rights in the states. There
are books that include discussions of religious freedom in the states
in the nineteenth century, and the few scholarly biographies of state
judges devote considerable space to constitutional issues. There is a
growing (but still small) body of journal literature about nineteenthcentury civil liberties in the state courts. One hopes that the texts
will soon begin to reflect this scholarship. But for now, works on
state constitutional rights are still atypical, restricted in scope, and
rarely used in constitutional history courses. When most legal historians and lawyers speak of constitutional history, they refer to the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and since the
Supreme Court did not begin incorporating the Bill of Rights into
7. Prentiss v. Shaw, Bangor Daily Whig and Courier, Apr. 23, 1867 (Me. Sup. Jud. Ct.,
Apr. 22, 1867), affd, 56 Me. 427 (1869).
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the Federal Constitution until the 1920's, they ignore important and
dramatic constitutional developments in the preceding century-anda-half.
With the bicentennial of the United States Constitution rapidly
approaching, the time is ripe for historians to reassess the writing of
constitutional history and to elevate to their proper place the contributions of the states to the American heritage of individual rights.

